When Right Feels Wrong: Cognitive Biases and the Slide Towards Moral Relativism

Abstract

The present study examined how cognitive biases contribute to Unintentional Moral Relativism (UMR)—the inadvertent misapplication of moral standards despite an individual’s intent to act ethically. Using a between-group quasi-experimental design, three experiments were conducted with 70 undergraduate psychology students from a public university in Islamabad to investigate the contrast effect, framing effect, and numerosity bias in moral judgment. Participants evaluated ethically ambiguous scenarios under different priming and presentation conditions. Although group differences across the three phases were statistically insignificant, significant within-group differences emerged when justifications were introduced, indicating that the number of reasons provided influenced perceived ethicality. These findings suggest that contextual and cognitive factors subtly shape moral evaluations, even in cultures emphasising moral absolutes. The study highlights the need for cross-cultural exploration of cognitive biases in ethical decision-making and the development of indigenous theories to better understand moral reasoning in non-Western contexts.